

ENVISAGING THE BODY OF THE CONDEMNED: THE POWER OF PLATONIC SYMBOLS

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Man has places in his heart which do not yet exist, and into them enters suffering in order that they may have existence.

—Leon Bloy

TO WRITE A UTOPIA is to invoke an explicit distinction between “imagined” worlds and “real” worlds. Yet commentators on Plato’s *Republic* have typically been dragged down—despite the text’s many flights of fancy—into questions of *realia* when considering the political institutions proposed in the text. They ask, “Can these imagined institutions be put into practice?” which is also to ask, “Can this imagined place become real?” The question of whether the *Republic*’s institutions can be realized suggests that the “imagined institutions” and “real institutions” somehow exist in completely separate cognitive domains; and that the imaginary has to be translated into the “real” before the two can be properly compared or the imaginary world assessed.¹ The real, on this account, refers to the material world. But of course, the “real” does not consist only of the material stuff of the world around us as embodied in “things.” Our real worlds are constructed as much out of conceptual orders and symbol systems as out of wood, steel, and concrete. The idea of the “real” includes the “normal” or orthodox symbolic systems that members of a community use to organize and make sense of their world. The imaginary, when understood in contrast to the real, includes, among other things, symbolic orders that attempt a certain heterodoxy vis à vis the hegemonic conceptual system that defines what is “real.” A utopian text that sets the imaginary against the real may be asking us to consider not whether a given set of fantastical institutions can be realized but rather whether anything changes in the world that we inhabit if, in our imaginations, we sometimes conceive of “things” differently than they “really are.”²

1. The literature on Plato is vast. Nor is this article easily situated within the context of any of the standard literature on the Platonic dialogues. I have had recourse to general texts on Plato (Taylor 1936; Vlastos 1978; Annas 1978, 1981; Rowe 1984; Kraut 1992) and standard commentaries (Jowett 1894, Adam 1963, Bosanquet 1895). I have consulted texts that have attempted to situate various of Plato’s works (particularly the *Republic* and the *Laws*) in their historical context (esp. Havelock 1963; Morrow 1960; Saunders 1991). I have also relied heavily on the thorough and careful work that several scholars have done on punishment in Plato (Adkins 1960; Mackenzie 1981; Saunders 1991; Lucas 1993; Stalley 1995, 1996).

2. On the utopian tradition, see Kateb 1972.

The Republic shows Plato to be self-consciously promoting the idea that φαντασία—the human capacity to have absent or non-embodied things appear before one’s eyes—has the power to effect cultural transformation. Throughout the *Republic*, Plato challenges crucial elements of his interlocutors’ Athenian ideologies and convinces his auditors of new principles by constructing novel but meaningful symbols for them to envisage. Plato’s dialogue in effect teaches the would-be philosopher-politician how to work inside the cave by (trying to) revolutionize a culture through the use of images and symbols capable of effecting the rhetorical displacements of a reigning ideology and their simultaneous replacement with a comprehensive new ideology. “Man has places in his heart which do not yet exist, and into them enters suffering in order that they may have existence,” wrote Leon Bloy, as quoted by Graham Greene. I chose this epigraph because it applies a topographical metaphor to human cognition: the heart has places whose boundaries are plastic. Plato, I will argue, might have written, “Man has places in his heart which do not yet exist, and into them enters φαντασία, fantasy or imagination, in order that they may have existence.” *The Republic* operates on the basis of two assumptions about the imagination: first that it is a fundamental component of the real, and also plastic or malleable, and second that these features make the imagination an instrument for transforming culture.

Socrates never tells us how any of his utopian institutions, other than government by philosopher-kings, could be put into practice. He does, however, have a lot to say about how to engage the conceptual systems that underlie behavior. There are, for instance, his discussions, in Books 2 and 3, of how to write stories suitable for the education of the guardian children. There is also the Book 10 discussion of the deleterious effects on politics of public narratives like tragedies. Moreover, Socrates gives specific instructions about how stories should be revised if poets are to have a good effect on the city. And the revisions, unlike the institutions, are doable, for we would need no more than these instructions to implement his proposals.

Socrates’ “How-to Manual for Poets” includes three main rules.³ First, never tell stories that show the gods doing harm, escaping punishment, or making war on one another. Forget all stories about the mutual attacks of Uranus, Cronus, and Zeus on one another and of Zeus’ escape from punishment for how he treated his father (378a–c). Second, if you must discuss miserably unhappy characters, like Niobe, do not blame their unhappiness on the gods, who can be said to be the causes only of good. Niobe’s suffering, and that of other weepy characters like her, must be said to have been caused by the injustice of her soul; any punishment meted out to Niobe and others by the gods must be said to have done them good. Thus at 380a–b we find:

If a poet should make up a tale about the sufferings (τὰ πάθη) of Niobe . . . or about the house of Pelops or the affairs of Troy, he is not allowed to say that these things, or anything like them, are the work of god. Or if they are to be the work of god, it is necessary for him to devise an explanation . . . [for the story], and it is necessary for him to say that

3. On Plato on poetry, a good starting place is Halliwell 1988.

since the god works justice and does good, such people benefit from being punished (ὠνίαντο κολαζόμενοι). The poet is not allowed to say that those who are punished (οἱ δίκην διδόντες) are unhappy thanks to the work of god. *It is, however, permissible to say that the bad are unhappy because they are in need of punishment (ὅτι ἐδεήθησαν κολάσεως) and that they receive benefits from god when they are punished (διδόντες δὲ δίκην ὠφελοῦντο ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ).*

The stories of the gods' painful retributions must be turned into stories of their beneficent and therapeutic reform of mortals. Third, the gods cannot be shown to be changeable (381c) or to deceive human beings by means of words, dreams, or visions (383a). Like rules one, two, and three, rule four is also theological: stories about the underworld should be revised. The disheartening descriptions of the afterlife that are current in Socrates' day and age must be forbidden because they are both untrue and injurious to future warriors (386a–387b). As Adeimantus has very recently reminded his fellow interlocutors, stories of the underworld typically concern the punishments of the afterlife (362d–363e), and so the thematic focus of Socrates' instructions to poets seems to be not merely the gods but also punishment. Socrates, the future convict, intimates that there is something at stake in stories about wrongdoing and its reward, about desert and the legitimate use of penal authority.

The punished body of the condemned makes its own very dramatic appearance in the *Republic* at the end of Book 4 in a narrative of Socrates' own construction, although his material is a story that he claims to have heard somewhere before. The story, in which Socrates uses not only narrative but also the mimesis he so much maligns, confirms that Socrates finds representations of punishment especially useful for changing people's minds (439e–440a):

Ἀλλ', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ποτὲ ἀκούσας τι† πιστεύω τούτῳ· ὥς ἄρα Λεόντιος ὁ Ἀγλαΐωνος ἀνιὼν ἐκ Πειραιῶς ὑπὸ τὸ βόρειον τεῖχος ἐκτός, αἰσθόμενος νεκροὺς παρὰ τῷ δημίῳ κειμένους, ἅμα μὲν ἰδεῖν ἐπιθυμοῖ, ἅμα δὲ αὐτὸν δυσχεραίνει καὶ ἀποτρέπει αὐτόν, καὶ τέως μὲν μάχιτό τε καὶ παρακαλύπττο, κρατούμενος δ' οὖν ὑπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας, διεκλύσας τοὺς ὀφθαλμούς, προσδραμὼν πρὸς τοὺς νεκρούς, “Ἴδού ὑμῖν,” ἔφη, “ὦ κακοδαίμονες, ἐμπλήσθητε τοῦ καλοῦ θεάματος.”

Once upon a time, I said, I heard the following and believe it: that Leontius son of Aglaion when he was on his way up from the Peiraeus perceived corpses lying along the outside of the North Long Wall beside the executioner. At one and the same time he desired to look at them and was disgusted and repelled at himself. And he struggled over this and covered his head, but was nonetheless overcome by desire and opening his eyes, he ran to the corpses, and he said, “Look then, you evil-spirits, and fill yourselves with the noble spectacle.”⁴

Socrates' description of Leontius suggests that it is bad to stare at the condemned body. Leontius loses not only a fight with himself but also the good fight, when he gives in to his desire to view the corpses; his curse against his

4. There is relatively little published commentary on this episode despite the fact that many scholars have been intrigued by it. Bosanquet (1895) writes in his commentary on 440c: “The implied distinction between appetites and emotions is an important step in ethical psychology though introduced by Plato in a bizarre form.” The point of this article is to explain *why* Plato uses the “bizarre form” of the story of Leontius to make this point. Craig (1994, 95–109) has a rather more extended treatment of the passage. He takes the

eyes, ὃ κακοδαίμονες, makes this clear. But the typical Athenian response to the spectacle of execution was not, in fact, to condemn the desire to look at a punished corpse.

The public display of wrongdoers was the crucial concluding moment of a punishment, according to the standard Athenian view. Characters in drama regularly exult over *seeing* a wrongdoer punished (e.g., Eur. *HF* 733; Aesch. *Ag.* 1605–11, *PV* 70–71; Soph. *Phil.* 1043; Ar. *Thesm.*, 939–45, 1001–56). And orators expressed the same commitment to spectacle. They expected that the families of murder victims would want to exercise their legal right to watch executions (Dem. 23.69). And they endorsed the idea that the display of the wrongdoer was generally necessary to complete a punishment (e.g., Aeschin. 2.181–82; Dem. 24.114). The φίλοι of a wrongdoer might find the spectacle of punishment painful, but everyone else could take pleasure in the wrongdoer's suffering.⁵ An ordinary Athenian could have looked at the corpses without cursing himself, and so Leontius is being rather un-

story as being a fable about curiosity, even philosophical curiosity. See also Annas 1981. The standard interpretation of the scene is that Leontius is a necrophiliac (e.g., Reeve 1988, 129). This view is based on the following comic fragment from Theopompus (fl. 410–370 B.C.E.): Λεωτροφίδης ὁ τρίμετρος ὡς λεοντίνος / εὐχρως τε φάναι καὶ χαρίεις ὥσπερ νεκρός (*PCG* Theopompus 25 [= *CAF* 24]). Bergk connected the fragment with the Plato passage, which led Kock to make the following emendations, following some of Bergk's suggestions: Λεωτροφίδης ὁ τρίμνεως λεοντίῳ / εὐχρως τε φαίνεται χαρίεις θ' ὥσπερ νεκρός (*CAF*, p. 739). I am not convinced that this emendation is justified. Some editors have kept the name λεοντίνος. Others have emended it to λεόντιχος. It is impossible to ascertain whether this fragment derives from a play written before or after the *Republic*.

5. There are no grounds for thinking that Leontius' discomfort at the sight of the corpses of the punished wrongdoer would be as normal in the Athenian context as it would be in our own context. According to the *Athenaion Politeia* (59.3), the Athenians had a set of officials called ἀστυνόμοι who had the job of, among other things, removing the corpses of those who died in the streets. Corpses were presumably a more regular part of the ordinary Athenian's everyday life than they are of ours. Moreover, the corpses at which Leontius was looking were the corpses of wrongdoers and therefore of convicted enemies of the city. They were recently executed corpses that the executioner was getting ready to throw into an open chasm so that they would be punished by ἀταξία as well as by execution (Allen 2000, chap. 9). The corpses would have been visible to the public, presumably, only during the execution and in the final moments before the executioner had discarded the bodies into a pit (a former quarry).

Greek literature suggests that there was a distinction between how φίλοι and ἐχθροί were expected to react to the "punished body." This distinction can be seen already in Homer when Achilles devises a shameful treatment for Hector (ἀεικέα μῆδετο ἔργα, *Il.* 22.395), preparing to mutilate his body. (This is the language used to talk about Zeus' punishment of Prometheus in Aeschylus *Prometheus Bound* 87–92.) The Trojans mourn the sight of Hector being dragged round the city, but the Greek soldiers stand over the body, consider its former beauty, and take turns stabbing it (*Il.* 22.395–515). It is true that in the *Poetics*, when Aristotle remarks that we look with pleasure at imitations (i.e., paintings) of things that we find it painful to look at in reality, his examples of what it is often painful to look at are wild beasts and corpses (1248b10–12). But Aristotle's remark is not incompatible with a cultural approach that distinguishes between the corpses of φίλοι, which are hard to look at, and the corpses of ἐχθροί, which are not.

The end of *Oedipus Tyrannus* also employs a distinction between how φίλοι and ἐχθροί will react to the punished body. After Oedipus blinds himself, the chorus responds to him as to a φίλος: "O suffering horrible for human eyes to see" (1297), "I am not able to look at you, although I want to ask questions, want to find out, want to gaze (δῶρῃσαι)" (1304–5). Oedipus responds: "O *philos*, you alone are still my companion" (1323). Creon, whom Oedipus has suspected of being an enemy throughout the play, introduces the possibility of an alternative response to Oedipus. He appears and has to reassure Oedipus: "I have not come to laugh at you, Oedipus" (1422). The play closes, however, by referring the spectacle neither to φίλοι nor to ἐχθροί, but to the citizens of Thebes. There is a command: "Inhabitants of Thebes, look, here is Oedipus (λεύσσει· Οἰδίπους ὄδε)" (1524). Then a lesson follows the injunction to the citizens to look. We are told that here is the man who once guessed the famous riddle, was great and envied, but whose life was an incorrect representation of reality. Misfortune proved the truer aspect of his life. The play closes with Oedipus redefined for his citizens, his status in the city redefined, and with this redefinition confirmed through spectacle. The blind

Athenian in his struggle to ignore the spectacle. Perhaps the eccentricity of Leontius' behavior can explain the fact that Glaucon has already heard of the incident, before Socrates relates it. "I too," he says, "have heard this" (440a). Whatever the case, Leontius' behavior is certainly atypical, and Socrates is using it to introduce a revision of the symbolic order that functioned in the context of Athenian punishment.

What is Leontius turning away from? Students of rhetoric have long been able to express the ways in which material objects and symbols are capable of speaking volumes, of conveying whole bundles of principles. Kenneth Burke wrote: "There is a difference between an abstract term naming the 'idea' of say, security, and a concrete image designed to stand for this idea, and to 'place it before our very eyes.' For one thing, if the image employs the full resources of imagination, *it will not represent merely one idea, but will contain a whole bundle of principles*, even ones that would be mutually contradictory if reduced to their purely ideational equivalents" (1969, 87 [my emphasis]). An image is worth a thousand explicated ideas, and so was the sight of the corpses beside the walls of Athens. Lying on the side of the road, the corpses were a visible product of the Athenian regime.⁶ Their exposed forms bespoke the practices and principles of the political order that had installed them in the city's landscape; they symbolized Athenian power. To look at the corpses without being too discomfited was to accept the forms of power, the penal practices, and the ideologies that not only culminated in but also validated their presence in the landscape.

In Athens these practices and ideologies were organized around four key phenomena: anger (ἡ ὀργή), honor, reciprocity, and social knowledge and memory.⁷ All of these were central to the operations of the courtroom. About 95 percent of the time that an orator stood up in public to accuse a wrongdoer, he would say that he had been inspired by his anger or his ὀργή.⁸ His

body of Oedipus can be read. Only φίλοι are supposed to resent the spectacle. Enemies will laugh. Citizens will watch and learn.

Euripides' *Electra* has an interesting moment that highlights the way in which the body of the condemned provides the living with an opportunity to tell a story about how the dead man's way of life has been refuted through his punishment. After Aegisthus is killed, Electra (907–56) stands over his corpse and berates it, listing his crimes and, more importantly, expounding the falsity of Aegisthus' world view: "This especially deceived you who did not understand" (938). "Be gone, you who knew nothing about the matters for which in time you . . . paid the price, evildoer that you are!" (952–53). The conclusion of the *OT* and Electra's speech to Aegisthus' corpse reflect the approach of historical Athenians to the body of the condemned. Aeschines remarks (2.181–82): "For it is not death that men dread, but a dishonored end. Is he not indeed to be pitied who must look into the sneering face of an enemy, and hear with his ears his insults?"

6. For a more thorough justification of this position, see Allen 2000, or Foucault 1991. On capital punishment, see Gernet 1924; Barkan 1935.

7. Allen 2000.

8. For claims about anger (ὀργή and other words for anger), see, among others: Isoc. 13.1, 20.6–9; An-doc. 1.24; Lys. 1.15, 15.12, 19.6, 29.6, 31.11; Isae. 1.10, 1.13, 1.18, 8.37; Dem. 19.265, 21.99, 28.63, 34.19, 35.31, 38.1, 59.51–55; Aeschin. 2.3, 3.3; Lycurg. 1.86, 1.91–92. For hostility or hatred toward an opponent, see: Isoc. 13.1; Lys. 7.20, 13.1, 15.12; Dem. 53.1–3, 53.15, 54.33, 58.49, 58.52, 59.1, 59.14–15. As for anger in the jurors, Demosthenes (21.123) tried to rouse his jury with the verbal adjective that expresses necessity: ὀργιστέον (it is necessary to be angry). See also Dem. 25.27, 40.5: "Be angry", 18.274: "If a man has sinned willfully, he receives anger (ὀργήν) and punishment (τιμωρίαν) for this"; Isoc. 18.42: εἰ ὀργιζόμενοι φανήσεσθε, 20.3: εἰ ὀργιζόμενοι φανήσεσθε, 20.22: ἐνσημανεῖσθε τὴν ὀργὴν τὴν ὑμετέραν; Lys. 12.90: δῆλοι ἐσεσθε ὡς ὀργιζόμενοι; Dem. 21.183: εἰ ὀργιζόμενοι φανήσεσθε, 25.27: ὀργὴν ἔχων φανήσεται.

anger at some wrong or insult to his honor would lead him to enter the competitive realm of the law courts. There he would try to do ill to the person who had done ill to him and so act in accordance with principles of reciprocity. He would do this in front of massed citizen juries gathered like spectators in the theater to watch, listen, and judge, and to remember, displaying their own anger in the process. One of the two competitors would leave the courtroom shamed. The public display of his shame would confirm the re-evaluation of relative status positions that was effected by the punishment. Anger, honor, reciprocity, spectacle, and social memory worked together to constitute Athenian punishments, with anger being the central concept. It inspired the need for punishment and established the guidelines for carrying it out; the judicial system in turn was set the task of regulating the operations of anger. Aeschines describes legislation as the process of being angry in advance (1.176), and Demosthenes explicitly describes law as a code that delineates how much anger should be attached to any given wrongdoing (21.42, 43):

Observe that the laws treat the willful and hubristic wrongdoer as worthy of greater anger and punishment (ὁσφ μείζονος ὀργῆς καὶ ζημίας ἀξιοῦσι) . . . ; this is reasonable because while the injured party everywhere deserves support, the law does not establish that the anger (τὴν ὀργήν) against the actor should be always the same.

Lysias also characterizes written law as a system that helps set up the public economy of anger when he describes a misguided prosecution as an act of excessive anger that has been carried out contrary to the guide of the law (παρανομία προθύμως, Lys. 12.23–24). Desert (τὰ ἄξια), justice (ἡ δίκη), and law (ὁ νόμος) could all be defined in terms of ὀργή, a term that was central to Athenian political discourse.⁹

The valorization of anger in the public sphere could be sustained only by drawing sharp limits between the public sphere and the private sphere so that anger would not also be valorized as a principle for action within the context of the family. The exclusion of women from the public sphere and the ideological requirement that women suppress their anger and channel it through men helped to keep anger out of familial interactions and thereby made a politics based on anger viable.¹⁰ The Athenians themselves sometimes acknowledged the centrality of ὀργή to Athenian politics. Sophocles does, for instance, in the *Antigone*, in a line in the famous choral “Ode to

9. Isae. 6.56: μάλιστα ἀγανακτῆσαί ἐστιν ἄξιον; Lys. 11.9: ἄξιον ὀργισθῆναι, 14.8: ἐγὼ δ' ἡγοῦμαι διὰ τοῦθ' ὑμᾶς δικαίως ἂν αὐτῷ ὀργίζεσθαι, 28.13–14: προσήκει ὀργίζεσθαι; Dem. 21.1: ἐπειδὴ δὲ καλῶς καὶ τὰ δίκαια ποίων ὁ δῆμος ἅπας οὕτως ὠργισθη, 21.127: δεῖ δὴ τοὺς γε βουλευμένους . . . δίκην λαμβάνειν, οὐχ . . . τὴν ὀργὴν ἔχειν (ἐχειν is used in the sense of “restrain” here.), 21.196: μῖσος καὶ φθόνος καὶ ὀργή· τούτων γὰρ ἄξια ποιεῖς., 24.152–53: τῆς μεγίστης ὀργῆς ὁ τοιοῦτος νομοθέτης ἄξιός ἐστιν, 24.200: ἄξιον ὀργῆς, 24.218: ἄξιον ὀργισθῆναι καὶ κολάσαι, 37.20: ἄξιον χαλεπαίνειν, 44.57: πλείστης ὀργῆς ἄξιοι, 45.20: ὀργῆς ἄξιον; Lycurg. 1.58: ἄξιον δ' ἐστὶν . . . αὐτῷ διὰ τὴν πρᾶξιν ὀργίζεσθαι ταύτην, 1.138: τῆς ἐσχάτης ὀργῆς δικαίως ἂν τυγχάνοντες. As Demosthenes puts it (24.118): “The laws permit the jurors, after hearing the case, to adjust their condemnation to what is necessary for their anger (ὀργήν).”

10. Deianira (Soph. *Trach.* 552): “It is not noble (καλὸν) for a woman who has any sense (νοῦν ἔχουσαν) to grow angry (ὀργαίνειν).” A Sophoclean chorus reminds Electra, the daughter of Agamemnon and Clytemnestra, that she should control herself and commit to Zeus the wrath (χόλον) that she feels for her mother (Soph. *El.* 177, 178). Athena makes a similar argument to the Furies; even she is persuaded by Zeus and lulls

Man” that is much misunderstood. His chorus praises the political achievements of humankind by celebrating the fact that humankind has taught itself voice, a wind-swift perceptiveness, and angers that were regulated by the city and that regulated the city (ἄστυνόμους ὀργὰς) (354–55). Scholars have often wanted to emend ὀργὰς on the grounds of sense, but in fact Sophocles was astutely pinpointing a central Athenian political idea. The Athenian who looked at the body of the condemned without displeasure was accepting the city’s conceptual norms that wove the ethics of anger, honor, reciprocity, and spectacle together in such a way as to legitimate the execution and display of the corpse. Such an Athenian spectator was also accepting the centrality of ὀργή to Athenian politics. Leontius rejects all these political principles in turning away from the bodies and exhibiting displeasure. His discomfiture means that he had distanced himself from the Athenian regime and the ideological habits that made those disposed bodies a “normal” sight in the landscape.

Socrates’ story—with its suggestion that we should recoil at the bodies of executed criminals rather than exulting in them—is an attempt to change the landscape of the road back from the Piraeus to Athens for his interlocutors. It is worth noticing that Leontius meets his great and famous temptation along the same road that Socrates turns away from at the beginning of the *Republic* (327a–328b). When Socrates turned away from the road past the corpses, and when Leontius tried to turn away from the corpses themselves, both men were turning (or trying to turn) their backs on the politics of punishment as it was practiced in Athens. After the dialogue’s interlocutors hear Socrates’ story, they too can either travel an Athenian road and continue to validate Athenian principles or, like Socrates, turn away from the road to Athens altogether and, like Leontius, do their best to turn away from the corpses. At the end of the *Republic*, Socrates tells a final story, the Myth of Er, a soldier who journeys to the underworld but lives to tell of the mysterious region where judges order those people who have lived good lives to journey to the right and upwards through the heavens while the unrighteous are commanded to take the left-hand and downwards-leading road (614c). The myth, and with it the dialogue, concludes as Socrates enjoins his interlocutors to think carefully about which road they will take back from his fantastical nether worlds to the real world (619e, 621c–621d). If they pay attention to Socrates, they will always hold to the high road (ἄνω ὁδοῦ). In the story of Leontius, Socrates is already giving his interlocutors new roads to travel by working on their imaginations to change what they see around them.

to rest the bitter rage of the black wave (κοίμα κελαινοῦ κύματος πικρὸν μένος, Aesch. *Eum.* 824–28). Medea and Jason share the following exchange (Eur. *Med.* 878–90, 909–20):

Medea. Shall I not be released from wrath? (οὐκ ἀπαλλαγθήσομαι θυμοῦ) . . . Thinking these things, I perceived myself to have much foolishness and to be angry without reason (μάτην θυμουμένη) . . . but we are only what it is possible for us to be (I do not speak a worse word), women. . . .

Jason. Woman, I praise these things, but I do not blame those earlier; for it is likely that the female kind will be angry (ὀργὰς ποιεῖσθαι) with a husband, when he smuggles other marriages. But now your heart has turned to something better, perceiving, although late, the winning counsel; these are the acts of a prudent woman (σώφρονος γυναικός).

Socrates' story about the body of the condemned therefore effectively opens up an imaginative distance between Athens and his interlocutors. But it should be no surprise to us that a story about punished corpses should work this way, for Socrates is breaking a taboo when he speaks about them. The Athenians valorized the spectacle of the condemned and regularly reiterated the need to conclude a punishment with spectacle. But almost no Athenian ever describes what he sees when he looks at the punished body of the wrongdoer. The typical Athenian response was to look but to say nothing. Thus Isaeus can talk about the physical abuse of an adulterer by saying (8.44): "This accursed Orestes had been taken in adultery and had suffered what it is fitting for those doing these sorts of things to suffer (παθὼν ὃ τι προσήκει τοὺς τὰ τοιαῦτα ποιοῦντας)." This vague remark describes what happened when a cuckolded husband, following the guideline of the law, took the opportunity to treat the adulterer "however he wanted" in front of a courtroom of jurors, with the one limitation being that he could not use a knife.¹¹ Comedy suggests that adulterers were treated to radishing (anal insertion of radishes or fish) and depilation. We cannot know what was done to adulterers.¹² What is clear, however, is that their physical abuse was never explicitly described in historical sources.¹³ Citizens watched, and held their peace about what they saw.

A similar reticence characterizes discussions of capital punishment. The orators eagerly recommended that their opponents suffer the "most extreme penalties," but when it came to actually mentioning an execution, they once again resorted to circumlocution.¹⁴ Socrates' own executioners are (Xen. *Ap.* 7): "Those taking care of this thing" (οἱ τούτου ἐπιμεληθέντες). In another case, the Eleven [prison-keepers] are instructed (Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.54–55) to: "take the wrongdoer and lead him away and, in the necessary place, to do the things that follow from this" (ὅμεις δὲ λαβόντες καὶ ἀπαγαγόντες οἱ ἔνδεκα οὗ δέ τὰ ἐκ τούτων πράττετε). The Athenians displayed citizens in their corporal punishments, memorialized their corporal suffering, and at the same time honored a silence about the body.¹⁵ This silence was the voice of acquiescence. With their silence, citizens agreed not to contest the punishment or to respond to the practices that brought the punishment about, other than by observing and accepting their products. The silence smoothed over whatever social disruption had been caused by the wrongdoer and reestablished the myth that the city operated on the basis of a perfectly coherent set of conceptual norms that could integrate all citizens into a harmonious and peaceful whole.¹⁶ The body of the condemned allowed for the stabilization of the city's conceptual order, so long as silence fell upon it.

11. Lys. 1.49; Dem. 59.66. For other references to the punishment of adulterers, see Isae. 8.44; Lys. 1.49; Xen. *Mem.* 2.1.5.

12. Cohen 1985, 385–87; Roy 1991, 73–76. *Ar. Nub.* 1083–84 (radishing and depilation), *Plut.* 168 (depilation), *Ach.* 849; Plato Com. *PCG*, frag. 189 (*Phaon*); Diog. Laert. 2.128; *Anth. Pal.* 9.520; Lucian *de mort. Peregr.* 9; Alciphron 3.26.4 (= 3.62). Cf. Catull. 15.19; Juv. 10.137.

13. Carey has recently pointed out that the orators were unlikely to have discussed the abuse of adulterers openly because they generally resorted to euphemism in discussion of sexual matters (1993, 53–55).

14. Todd forthcoming.

15. Allen 2000.

16. For full discussion of the importance to punishment of the ideas of peace and silence, especially democratic punishment, see Allen 2000, chap. 9.

Historical references to the body of the condemned in Athenian literature are thus very rare and, more importantly, every single historical description of the condemned body is used to challenge the punitive regime that carried out the punishment.¹⁷ Those few people who broke the taboo against speaking about the body of the condemned—like the Samian Duris who, as quoted by Plutarch, described how Pericles' regime punished a group of Samians (*Per.* 28.1–3)—unsettled the myth that the city had achieved a perfectly stable ethical order. Fifth- and fourth-century sources yield only two descriptions of what actually happened when someone was executed in the city of Athens. We hear about the corpses seen by Leontius and we are told, again by Plato, about the body of Socrates in the *Phaedo*. Plato's unique and also anti-Athenian willingness to describe the body of the condemned reflects his awareness that discussions of punishment put at issue principles that are fundamental to a regime's authority and, more importantly, offer an opportunity either to confirm or to repudiate those principles.

Socrates, whose own punished body will become an enduring element of Western iconography, thanks to Plato's description of his death, proceeds from his story about Leontius to make his repudiation of Athenian conceptual orders explicit. He glosses his story thus (440a): "This story surely means that anger sometimes does battle against the desires as a thing distinct from what it battles" (Οὔτος μέντοι, ἔφην, ὁ λόγος σημαίνει τὴν ὀργὴν πολεμεῖν ἐνίοτε ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις ὥς ἄλλο ὄν ἄλλω). Socrates breaks the silence about the body of the condemned not merely to resignify the symbol of the corpses on a superficial level by treating them as a negative rather than a positive sight but also, and more fundamentally, to address a concept, ἡ ὀργή, at the heart of the Athenian political order. The Athenians thought that anger was what drove people to the spectacle of punishment.¹⁸ Socrates counters by arguing that it is instead desire (αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι) that does this, and that a proper use of anger would keep people away from the punitive spectacle. Moreover, this proper use of anger arises only when one can recognize that anger is separate from and works against desire.

Socrates' claim that ἡ ὀργή is separate from desire goes against standard Athenian understandings of anger. The word ὀργή referred not only to "anger" but also to "sexual fertility" or "sexual passion." Our "orgy" and "orgasm" are from the same root as ὀργή, and it could be used to talk about sexual fertility in both plants and people (Hippoc. *Aer.* 5.13; cf. Xen. *Oec.* 19.19; Hdt. 4.199, where the cognate verb is used this way). The noun was etymologically linked to the verb ὀργάω, which means to feel sexual desire. For that matter, the organ known as the θυμός—the source of anger in Homeric texts—was associated with erotic passions as well as with anger,¹⁹ and a single one of the body's liquids, black bile, could give rise to both anger and lust: thus the author of the pseudo-Aristotelian *Problems* could write even well after the fifth century (30.1 953b34–36): "Those who have a large quantity of hot black bile become manic (μανικοί) or clever (εὐφρεῖς) or

17. For descriptions of executions in the city, see Lys. 12.18–21, 19.7–8; Plut. *Per.* 28.1–3, *Phoc.* 37–38; Pl. *Phd.*, *Resp.* 439e–440a.

18. Allen 2000, chaps. 4–9.

19. See, for instance, *Il.* 5.243, 9.343; Theoc. 17.130; Eur. *Med.* 8; Pind. *Nem.* 5.31. See also Padel 1992.

erotic (ἐρωτικοί) or easily moved to anger and desire (εὐκίνητοι πρὸς τοὺς θυμοὺς καὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας).” In the conceptual world of the Athenians, sexual desire and anger were part of a single passionable phenomenon, and black bile made one easily moved in respect to both.

Counter to this idea, Socrates is trying to convince poor Glaucon that the soul is, of all things, tripartite, divided into reason, anger, and desire. The argument for the tripartite soul has begun just shortly before we arrive at the Leontius story, and Socrates, as we will see, is explicit about the fact that the separation of anger from desire will be intuitively inconceivable to Glaucon. Socrates begins his argument for the tripartite soul by arguing simply that the soul is—at a minimum—divided into reason and passion. To make this case, Socrates uses examples of people who struggle with themselves over some decision: consider, for instance, the ill who desperately desire a drink despite what reason and the doctor’s orders tell them (439d):

Is there not something in the soul that commands them to drink and something that forbids them to drink, something distinct that overcomes the element commanding them to drink? . . . And surely, when what prohibits these things arises, it arises from reason (ἐκ λογισμοῦ), and the impulses that put up resistance arise from passions and disease (διὰ παθημάτων τε καὶ νοσημάτων). . . . It would not be irrational then if we thought that there were two forces different from one another [in the soul], and called that part of the soul with which one reasons the rational element (λογιστικόν) and called that part of the soul with which one lusts (ἐρᾷ) and hungers and thirsts—and there are all the flutterings (ἐπτόηται) from the other desires (περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐπιθυμίας)—irrational and a matter of desire (ἀλόγιστόν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμητικόν).

Glaucon agrees with Socrates’ assessment that such struggles of the self indicate that reason and desire are two separate parts of the soul. But with the next step in the argument Socrates hits a stumbling block (439e):

Let us, then, mark out these two elements as being in the soul. But in respect to the element of the *thumos* and that with which we anger (τὸ δὲ δὴ τοῦ θυμοῦ καὶ ὃ θυμούμεθα), is it a third thing or should it be considered to be a twin to one of the others (ἢ τούτων ποτέρῳ ἂν εἴη ὁμοφύεζ)?

Glaucon has a ready answer, and it is the standard Athenian answer. Anger, he says, might perhaps be identified as being a twin to desire (Ἴσως, ἔφη, τῷ ἐτέρῳ, τῷ ἐπιθυμητικῷ, 439e). When Glaucon responds that anger might be identified as a twin to the element in the soul that gives rise to erotic lust, he is acknowledging not only that both anger and lust arise from the θυμός but also the idea that anger and eros might be different aspects of a single passion.

It is precisely at this point, when Socrates wants to change Glaucon’s mind but has run up against his Athenian conceptual universe, that Socrates tells the story of Leontius. As it turns out, the tactic works. The story convinces Glaucon to agree with Socrates that anger fights desire. When Socrates concludes his story with the gloss: “This means that anger is separate from desire,” Glaucon replies, “Yes, it means this” (Σημαίνει γάρ, ἔφη, 440a). Nothing but the story, the symbol of Leontius, has intervened between the moment when Glaucon disagreed and the moment when he agreed. Socrates

has changed Glaucon's mind by setting an image of the possibility of the tripartite soul before his mind's eye. Glaucon can believe that anger is its own faculty once he can imagine somebody acting with a soul organized that way. Socrates himself then takes the time to note his success in revising his interlocutor's habitual understanding of how the soul works (440e):

ἀλλ' ἡ πρὸς τούτῳ καὶ τόδε ἐνθυμηῖ; . . . "Ὅτι τούναντίον ἡ ἀρτίως ἡμῖν φαίνεται περὶ τοῦ θυμοειδοῦς, τότε μὲν γὰρ ἐπιθυμητικόν τι αὐτὸ φόμεθα εἶναι, νῦν δὲ πολλοῦ δεῖν φαμέν, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον αὐτὸ ἐν τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς στάσει τίθεσθαι τὰ ὅπλα πρὸς τὸ λογιστικόν.

But have you understood what is happening in regard to this matter? . . . What is now obvious in respect to the angry or spirited element is the opposite of what we thought quite recently. Earlier we thought that the spirited element was itself part of the desiring element, but now we see that it is much more necessary to understand that it bears arms for reason during the struggles in the soul.

Socrates has proved, counter to his interlocutor's Athenian intuitions, that anger is separate from desire. Given how fundamental to Athenian politics were systems of value based on ideas about anger and passion, Socrates' argument is radical in all possible senses of the word. But Glaucon has to see it to believe it, a point that is crucial to understanding Socrates' use of symbols to revise his interlocutors' habits of mind.

Burke writes: "The symbol might be called a *word* invented by the artist to specify a particular grouping or pattern or emphasizing of experiences—and the work of art in which the symbol figures might be called a definition of this word. . . . The symbol may also serve to force patterns [of experience] upon the audience, . . . , the universal experiences being capable of other groupings or patterns than those which characterize a particular reader" (Burke 1989, 110 [my emphasis]). When we envisage Leontius, we hold the idea of the tripartite soul in our minds, a foreign idea, an idea that would ultimately have come into conflict with any standard Athenian conceptualization of the soul. If we decide that Leontius' reaction to the corpses is the normal one, as Socrates would have us do, then the Athenian symbol world has been erased in our minds and replaced with a new conceptual order that will eventually necessitate a new normative order: the world of the philosopher-kings, reformatory punishment, and a public sphere that women can enter. The foreign idea is brought home thanks to the symbol of Leontius, and will have great consequences.

Note that Socrates, when he discusses Glaucon's change of mind, also casually ceases to use the word ἡ ὀργή to refer to the anger component of the soul and replaces it with θυμοειδής, which has been introduced in section 375a–376c. Θυμοειδής, which is a Platonic invention but calls to mind Homeric words, thanks to its stress on the θυμός and its suffix, generally belongs to the vocabulary of philosophers and scientists, appearing outside of Plato only in Xenophon, Hippocrates, and Aristotle. This adjective (with other words related to θυμός) becomes the standard Platonic word for anger, and the substantive ὀργή, an oratorical favorite, is used in only three other places in the *Republic*: once to describe the desires and passions of a "beast" (493a), once to describe the "humors" or "tempers" of the masses (493d), and

once to describe what happens when anger has not been entirely gotten under control (572a). The adjective ὀργίλος is used once, and the passion it represents is criticized and set in opposition to the high-spiritedness of the man who is θυμοειδής (411c). There are twenty-eight instances of θυμοειδής in the *Republic* and three elsewhere in the Platonic corpus.²⁰ This dialogue is explicit about its concern with anger and, therefore, about Socrates' challenge to Athens. Socrates is not only revising the Athenian conceptualization of anger but erasing it. The word ὀργή can no longer be used once desire and anger have been separated from one another, and Socrates finalizes the erasure of ὀργή by inventing a new vocabulary of anger to replace it.

Socrates self-consciously invents a new vocabulary for desire also, and reflects on that process in Book 9 (580d–581a):

We said that there was one part of the soul with which a man learns, a part with which he grows angry, and a third part that, because it was made up of many elements (διὰ πολυειδίαν), we will not be able to denote with a single name particular to it (ἐνὶ οὐκ ἔσχομεν ὀνόματι προσειπεῖν ἰδίῳ αὐτοῦ) but that we named (ἐπωνομάσαμεν) after that which was greatest and strongest in it; for we called it the desiring part itself (ἐπιθυμητικὸν γὰρ αὐτὸ κεκλήκαμεν) because of the seriousness of its appetites (διὰ σφοδρότητα τῶν . . . ἐπιθυμιῶν) for food and drink and sex and all the things that follow on these, and also we called it the money-loving part because such desires are accomplished with money especially.

Thanks to the division of anger from desire, the words θυμός and ὀργή can no longer be used to talk about the body's appetites for sex, food, and drink. Socrates therefore lays more emphasis than had been typical in earlier texts on ἐπιθυμία and on a second word for desire, ὁρμή (for ὁρμή, cf. 439b, 451c, 506e, 511b, 532a, 611e). By the time of Stoic philosophy, ὁρμή will be the standard word for desire, and Socrates will have engineered a replacement of the Athenian soul with a new one. The Platonic vocabulary of passion, a vocabulary that uses new words for both anger and erotic desire, seals the transition from the Athenian paradigm for thinking about human cognitive and passional experience to the Socratic/Platonic paradigm. Socrates' work is complete when what should have been foreign to Athenian soil has been naturalized as far as Glaucon is concerned—when what was inconceivable to Glaucon has become conceivable to him and new places have been made in his mind. When Socrates changes Glaucon's mind about the constitution of the soul and the proper way to react to the body of the condemned, he has changed not only his mental topography but also the meaning that the actual topography of the Athenian landscape holds for him. But if the topography of the real has changed for Glaucon, it is only because the topography of the ideational has changed first. Plato's depiction of Socrates' success at making an inconceivable idea conceivable to Glaucon announces the disciple's conviction that symbols are powerful enough to revise a citizen's mental topography.

It might be said that when Plato and his Socrates rely on the power of pictures, depiction, and symbols to make the inconceivable conceivable for

20. Others have commented on Plato's reintroduction of the archaic term for anger, θυμός, and on his efforts to banish anger. See Rickert 1987, 99–101; Padel 1992, p. 28, n. 62.

audiences grounded in particular historical moments, both are employing rhetorical techniques that Aristotle will elaborate later, in his *Rhetoric*: tricks of φαντασία and of putting things before people's eyes (πρὸ ὀμμάτων ποιεῖν). In fact, Aristotle treats the Socratic dialogues as an exemplary form of ethical narrative (3.16.8 1417a20), and uses an explicitly topographical metaphor to describe the rhetorical work of shifting people's ideological paradigms. He uses the image of a "road" to describe the rhetorical experience shared by author and audience (Aristotle is concerned not only with spoken but also with written texts, cf. 3.12.1–6 1413b5–1414a25). He argues that a rhetorician has to begin by making land (χώρα, 3.17.15 1418b16) or space in the hearers' minds and by paving the way (ὁδοποίησις) for his or her text or argument (3.14 1414b21), on the assumption that their minds will be full of opinions different from the speaker's own. Next, there is the effort to find proofs, which Aristotle in Book 1.12 sets up as being analogous to the goal of finding boundary points to which to lead the hearer (τέκμαρ, πέρας 1.12.4 1357b9). A speech is therefore equivalent to the effort of leading someone along a road to that boundary post where the outer limits of the persuasive are, and stylistic features can affect the speaker's ability to lead people to this new place. If, for instance, the speaker gets the rhythm of delivery wrong, "[the auditor] is checked by the speaker's stopping, [and] a sort of stumble is bound to occur in consequence of a sudden stop. If rhythmic periods are too long, speakers leave the hearer behind, just as people who do not turn till past the ordinary limit (ὥσπερ οἱ ἐξωτέρῳ ἀποκάμπτοντες τοῦ τέρματος) leave behind those who are walking with them" (3.9.6 1409b20–24). The rhetorical effort, the effort at persuasion, which is the attempt to make the implausible plausible, is, metaphorically speaking, equivalent to getting listeners to go along the road one wishes them to go on, even if they have never seen, let alone been on, that road before.

In order to succeed at getting a nonphilosophical audience to follow one along one's chosen road, one must use tricks of style, the subject of Book 3 of the *Rhetoric*. Tricks of style are such techniques of language as are able to produce clarity (3.1.6 1404a10). They are useful because what is clear is most easily learned. Aristotle is careful, it must be said, to say that although tricks of style make a difference they do not make such a very great difference; nonetheless, when they work, it is because all tricks of style set in motion the audience's capacity for fantasy or imagination (φαντασία, 3.1.6 1404a11). Only when something has appeared "before the eyes" of the audience—a phrase that Aristotle repeats over and over in Book 3—has clarity been achieved.²¹

Aristotle glosses the phrase "to put before the eyes" thus (3.11.1 1411b23–26): "We must now explain the meaning of 'before the eyes' and what must be done to produce this. I mean that things are set before the eyes by words that signify actuality (ἐνέργεια)." Ἐνέργεια is the word that Aristotle uses throughout his corpus to express actual as opposed to potential existence,

21. It is especially metaphor that is able to achieve clarity (*Rh.* 3.2.8 1405a6) and metaphors succeed when they set things before the eyes (*Rh.* 3.11.1 1411b23).

the latter being described as δύνανμις. Ideas have to be given some sort of actual or “real” existence in the imagination if they are to be persuasive.

Aristotle is explicit about the need to vivify ideas when he says, just a little further on in the text, that arguments are clear when the soulless elements in them have been ensouled (τὸ τὰ ἄψυχα ἔμψυχα ποιεῖν). He says (3.11.2–3 1411b26–33): “For instance, to say that a good man is ‘four-square’ is a metaphor, for both [the man and the square] are complete, but the phrase does not express actuality, whereas ‘of one having the prime of his life in full bloom’ does . . . Homer often makes use of the opportunity to speak through metaphor and make inanimate or soulless (ἄψυχα) things animate (or ensouled, ἔμψυχα).” The idea seems to be that abstract principles must not be expressed abstractly; rather they must be expressed via the concrete particulars of the sensible, and also live, world. To express an abstract idea (for instance, the idea of “completion” or “maturity”) by means of a concrete particular (the image of “being in full-bloom”) is to take a soulless thing (the abstraction) and to “ensoul” it, to give it embodiment, to give it life.²²

Aristotle continues (3.11.4–5 1411b33–1412a5):

Homer’s popularity is due to creating actuality in all such cases, as in the following examples: “Once again the shameless (ἀναιδής) stone rolled down to the plain . . .” For in [this] example there is an appearance of actuality because of the ensouled-ness (ἐν πᾶσι γὰρ τούτοις διὰ τὸ ἔμψυχα εἶναι ἐνεργοῦντα φαίνεται) . . . Homer has attached this attribute [“shameless”] by the employment of proportional metaphor; for as the stone is to Sisyphus, so is the shameless one to the one who is shamelessly treated (ὁ ἀναισχυντῶν πρὸς τὸν ἀναισχυντούμενον).

Aristotle seems to be saying that the stone can be called shameless because of its place in the symbolic order that determines the nature of the relationship between the shaming punisher, represented by the stone, and the shamed punished, represented by Sisyphus.²³ (It is noteworthy that once again a story of punishment provides a key example for explaining how stories interact with the audience’s imaginative faculties.) What is at stake is not just that the stone is personified but that an idea or principle—the idea that to punish someone over and over again, mercilessly, is to act without shame—has been dramatized. The thought behind Aristotle’s analysis is that we are cognitively more willing to accept the possibility of the existence of particulars than of abstract principles. That being the case, if one wishes to make room for a new abstract idea in people’s minds, one has first to provide them with at least one particular that embodies that abstract principle. Once they have a mental grip on the particular, they will be able to conceive of the abstract idea drawn from it. Abstract principles are inanimate things or soulless things that have to be given a soul, if they are to be believed and understood. They have to be embodied if they are going to appear before the eyes.

22. Cope’s commentary ([1877] 1966) has nothing to say about the philosophical claims implicit in this argument.

23. Cope ([1877] 1966) points out that Aristotle is encouraging people to use examples chosen from among things that live. He disagrees with Aristotle’s gloss of the Homeric ἀναιδής as ὁ ἀναισχυντῶν, arguing that there is no reason to turn “unmerciful” into “shameless.”

While I would not go quite so far as to give Plato the anachronistic label of having been an Aristotelian rhetorician, I would like to argue that he shared a similar view about the power of images and narratives to put things before the eyes, to make abstract principles conceivable, and thereby to change mental topography and to revise the realm of the imaginary in which concepts undergirding cultural systems of value do their work. Plato himself acknowledged both the idea that images could encapsulate sets of principles and symbolic orders and the idea that people have to see it to believe it: we must be able to envision a particular before we can conceive of the abstract idea that is grounded in that particular.

Plato's Socrates is explicit about the first principle, the idea that a symbol contains a whole bundle of principles, when he discusses the stories used to educate the guardian children.²⁴ We have seen that Socrates focuses on revising stories of punishment so that they will teach a reformatory, not a retributive, lesson. Socrates theorizes this process of revision explicitly. The founders of the ideal city may not have time or may be unable to invent new stories. Instead (379a, 382d):

It is fitting for founders to know the patterns according to which the poets must write their mythologies (οἰκισταῖς δὲ τοὺς μὲν τύπους προσήκει εἰδέναι ἐν οἷς δεῖ μυθολογεῖν τοὺς ποιητάς) and from which it is necessary for them not to deviate if they make up tales, but it is not necessary for us ourselves to make the stories (οὐ μὲν αὐτοῖς γε ποιητέον μύθους). . . . In respect to the mythology that we were discussing just now . . . we can assimilate the false to the true (ἀφομοιοῦντες τῷ ἀληθεῖ τὸ ψεῦδος) as much as possible and make it useful in this fashion.

The idea that stories must adhere to a type or τύπος seems to be equivalent to the Burkean idea that symbols encode a set of principles. Socrates uses the idea of the τύπος repeatedly throughout the discussion of the children's education to describe the principles according to which stories should be constructed (377b, 377c, 379a, 380c, 383a, 383c, 387c, 396e, 397c, 398b, 398d, 402d, 403e). In particular, fictions or myths are to be assimilated to the truth of Socratic principles: symbols must encapsulate not the Athenian paradigm of desert, which privileges anger and honor, but a Socratic paradigm, which privileges knowledge and virtue. Stories must reflect and show in operation a coherent Socratic conceptualization of authority and justice. In adhering to the "types" or symbolic structures presented by Socrates, those who tell stories to the young will be able to "fashion" (πλάττεται) their souls and to ensure that an impression (τύπος) is stamped into each (ἐνδύεται) such as is desirable to have inscribed (ἐνσημήνασθαι) there (377b2). A story, like the impression of a seal or the cast of a relief (more literal examples of τύποι), is capable of providing for the transfer of a coherent and integrated symbolic order. In telling the story of Leontius, Socrates does exactly the

24. Lear (1992, 184–215, esp. 186–87) gives a very useful account of this educational section as part of an argument that works to explain why it is that Plato thinks the character of the citizens engenders the nature of the polis and vice versa. Lear uses the concepts of internalization and externalization (with μίμησις functioning to allow for internalization) to explain the *Republic* as a commentary on the psycho-cultural interaction. The education section of the dialogue is crucial because it is here that Plato makes his argument about how the individual and the external world are linked.

sort of work that he recommends for his poets: he replaces the Athenian symbolic order with his own symbolic paradigm, adhering to the τύποι that he has devised. Book 2 concludes (at 383c) with Glaucon's promise to accept Socrates' τύποι as νόμοι (laws). Thereafter his pictures will be worth Socrates' bundle of principles. Not only has Socrates been explicit about the idea that images can encapsulate sets of principles and symbolic orders but he has been explicit enough for Glaucon to understand the point.

As for the second idea—that you have to see it to believe it—Plato's Socrates is explicit about this when he returns to a discussion of the tripartite soul in Book 9 at 588c. There Socrates goes a step beyond what he recommends for his founders and invents new images out of the whole cloth of the imaginary. Socrates suggests that he and his interlocutors will better understand the firm division between reason, anger, and desire if they should “fashion (πλάσαντες) a symbol (εἰκόνα) of the soul with speech, in order that the one who was saying these things [about justice and injustice] might see what he was saying” (588b–c). The icon that Socrates fashions is the famous image of the soul as being one part human (the reasoning element), one part lion (the angry element), and one part many-headed beast (the shape given to desire). The result of Socrates' art is an image that allows Socrates to describe the life of injustice as being when the “human being” in the soul is preyed upon by the many-headed beast or by the lion (588d). It is also an image that retrospectively justifies the pun in Leontius' name on “lion-like.” The many-headed beast is, of course, the most “fantastical” and “unimaginable” element of the tripartite soul, and Glaucon responds to Socrates' suggestion that they fashion such an image by saying: “That would be the work of a fearsome plastic artist, but nevertheless, since *logos* is more successfully fashioned than wax and other such things, let it be fashioned” (Δεινοῦ πλάστου, ἔφη, τὸ ἔργον· ὅμως δέ, ἐπειδὴ εὐπλαστότερον κηροῦ καὶ τῶν τοιούτων λόγος, πεπλάσθω).

To fashion images (εἰκόνες) is to fashion *logos*. It is to reshape language and reason, the realms in which our minds roam, the topographies of the imaginary. Refashioning symbols shifts the conceptual possibilities available to an audience and the outer limits of what is conceivable for them. Neither Socrates nor any of his interlocutors ever suggests that the assorted *institutions* at issue in the *Republic* will be easily fashioned, but here Glaucon suggests (and Socrates seems to agree) that symbolic orders, which are the product of *logos*, are in fact very easily fashioned and revised and that it is reasonable for a philosopher to see himself as a δεινὸς πλάστης, an artist molding the plastic imagination.

Socrates' interlocutors, once they have principles in hand for understanding how the imagination works, and have encountered the idea that they are δεινοὶ πλάσται, at last have a way of understanding the work that has been carried out during their conversation with Socrates about an ideal city. In another exchange with Glaucon, Socrates describes the task of imagining the just city thus (472c–d):

We investigated the nature of justice itself and asked what the perfectly just man, if he should exist, would be like, and we also [asked about] injustice and the completely unjust man for the sake of having a paradigm (παράδειγματος ἅρα ἔνεκα). We wanted to gaze upon these [men] so that we would have to acknowledge that whatever we might learn about the sorts of men they were, as far as happiness and its opposite are concerned, also applies to us and that the man among us who is as much like them as possible will equally have their fate. We did not do this for the sake of proving that these ideals can be realized (ἀλλ' οὐ τούτου ἔνεκα, ἵν' ἀποδείξωμεν ὡς δυνατόν ταῦτα γίγνεσθαι).

In that, you speak truly.

Do you think, then, that he would be any the less a good painter, who, after portraying the pattern of the ideally beautiful man and omitting no touch required for the perfection of the picture, would not be able to prove that it is actually possible for such a man to exist?

No, by Zeus.

Then were not we, as we say, trying to create in words the pattern (παράδειγμα λόγῳ) of a good city?

Socrates compares his work to that of a painter, and his own ideal city is constructed on both the principle that an image is worth a thousand explicated ideas and the principle that you have to see it to believe it. If Socrates condemns the tragedians because their images and narratives are powerful and have, in his view, practical and empirical effects on the world, then he must equally consider his own images powerful and pragmatically effective. Plato follows the tragedians in recognizing that images of the condemned are especially useful for engaging the plastic imagination; this is because the body of the condemned must always be made to mean something. The difference between the tragedians' images and Socrates' is only that, from Socrates' point of view, his are based on the right τύπος or general type and encapsulate the right symbolic order; they are based, in other words, on the right set of principles. Images like the Leontius story create the right sort of fantasies and therefore the right sort of mental or ideological topography in the mind of the audience. The tragedians' images do not.

The *Republic* seeks to revise *logos* and must be considered political to the degree that it not only revises concepts fundamental to Athenian politics but also articulates those revisions in a fashion that makes the revised concepts easily understandable and almost unnoticeably assimilable by those who read Socrates' symbols. Plato also teaches his interlocutors, and future philosophers, to work inside the cave, within the realm of ideology, with the tools of the rhetorician: they need the ability to take people along new roads by fashioning *logos*, which is to say, by manipulating the plasticity of the imagination. The *Republic* is utopian in revealing Plato's conviction that rhetoric is powerful enough to effect revisions of ideological systems of value, and Socrates' narratives produce real change insofar as they succeed at refashioning his audience's ideational topography of the "real."

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